

EVOLVING GREEN STATE

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ABSTRACT: The research paper deals with the evolution of Green state. Traditionally state is understood in terms of territory, population and sovereignty. The politics of environmental crisis has diluted these elements of state as environmental problem is a transnational problem. Hence green state is a transnational state and its elements are also transnational. It is different from capitalist or Marxist state. For achieving the green state there is need to restructure the existing state in the green direction. Green state is a telescopic state which can see future generation. Green state is flexible, decentralized and centralized if necessary. It is a combination of direct participation and political participation. It is an enabling state and freedom oriented state. Green state advocates small nations and small units of population. It includes spiritual subjects. Green state consists of seven elements- ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, non-violence, decentralization, green economy and green democracy. It believes in ‘‘Think globally and act locally’’

KEYWORDS: Green democracy, Transnational state, Green politics, Inclusiveness, Deliberative democracy.

I. INTRODUCTION

The term state can be defined in a number of ways. In broad sense it is used to denote a society and as a particular organ of society (government, nation, territory) in the narrow sense. Thus the nature of the state is defined according to its usage. There are many theories of state- state as the personification of national legal order, state as order and as community constituted by the order, state as the sociological unity, state as an organism, state as domination and state as power¹. The simplest definition of the state is that it is composed of the set of individuals and organizations legally authorized to make binding decisions for a society within a particular territory. Thus, state represents a common collective interest that is something more than the sum of the interests of its components. In contrast to simple Marxist theory, this common collective interest need not be reducible to the interests of the dominant class in society; rather, the state can be autonomous.²

The functions of the state are done by its organs. Broadly individuals are defined as the organs of the state and narrowly officials are the organs of the state. Further state has been defined as the subject of rights and duties. Obligations and rights of the state are the obligations and rights of its organs. The elements of the state are- territory, time, recognition, people of the state, competence of the state as material sphere of validity of the national order, conflicts of laws, rights and duties of the state and power of the state³. Traditional doctrine distinguishes the three elements of the state- territory, people and power. Territory is the essence of the state. The existence of the state as Willoughby says depends upon the claim of its territory. Territory of a state is not linked with geography. The territory of a state must not necessarily consist of one piece of land. Such territory is named as integrated territory. The state territory may be dismembered. Thus unity of the state territory is a juristic one and geographical. Moreover there can occur impenetrability of the states⁴. Traditionally time was not considered as the element of the state. If we regard territory as an element of the state then we have to regard the period of its existence as an element of the state. Time depicts the birth and death of the state as no two states can exist in the

¹. Kelsen, Hans (2006), *General Theory of Law and State: Law and Society Series*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers.

². Dryzek, John S. et al. (2003), *Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway*, New York: Oxford university Press.

³. Ibid.

⁴. Ibid.

same space at the same time. Further the same international law regulates the spatial and temporal sequence. Time element of the state also includes the recognition of state- recognition of the state as a community, de jure and de facto recognition, recognition by the league of nation.⁵ People of the state are considered as the personal sphere of validity of the national legal order and citizenship. The power of the state is defined as the validity and efficacy of the national legal order as well as legislative, executive and judicial. However there are different forms of states. The classification of the states is according to the form of the constitution. A state can be defined as republic or monarchy in terms of the characteristic of the constitution. Further states are described in terms of its organizations- centralization or decentralization. Max Weber defined state as entity which can claim legitimate use of violence⁶. For Marx the function of the state is to maintain and defend class domination and exploitation⁷. For liberals, the state has instrumental value, endowing its citizens guided by the interest of the whole with state derived rights and obligations. The abstract state and the abstract citizen complement and entail each other. The interest of the whole and the abstract state are of major relevance to the ability of liberal democracies to address environmental issues. On the face of it, the idea that the government ought to work in the public interest suggests a sphere where concerns for the environment could be developed.⁸

More recently, politics and the state have become fused with a concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty historically has been associated with a rule of law, involving a person or a group of people with the authority to establish laws over a given geographic area and a given people. In modern political science terminology, only a state can be thought of as displaying sovereignty. Eco-politics challenges the boundaries of sovereign territory as it slices effortlessly from one state to another, in the form of acid rain, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), radioactive fallout, polluted waterways, and so on. From this perspective, eco-politics might more properly be said to occupy the space of international political theory.

To put it another way, the problem of the space of eco-politics cannot be reduced to questions of where territorial lines are drawn and whether or not political issues cross these territorial lines;

⁵. Hans Kelsen, Hans (2006), *General Theory of Law and State: Law and Society Series*.

⁶. Parkin, Frank (2002), *Max Weber: An Introduction*, London: Routledge Publication.

⁷. Bottomore, Tom (1983), *Marxist Thoughts*, London: Blackwell Reference.

⁸. Barry, John (2001), *Sustaining Liberal democracy: Ecological Challenges and Opportunities*, London: Palgrave.

the problem of eco-politics also involves how these lines are drawn and what is done to the spaces inside these lines to make them sovereign territories. From Bull's perspective, all populations and territories are capable of being states, provided they have governments and are able to exercise sovereignty. Similarly, Waltz un-problematically thinks the relationship between population or territory and sovereignty or government⁹. State sovereignty needs to be understood not as a discrete set of claims based solely on state power, but rather as a historically constituted bundle of competences whose character depends on the changing constitution of the international legal, political and economic order as a whole.

II. HEADINGS

ECOLOGICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE STATE

In many discussions on the environmental issue the conclusion is reached that a growing interference of the state in society is absolutely necessary. In large sections of society the state is seen as an indispensable actor and often as the essential problem-solver in respect of environmental problems. This position is defended because of several reasons. A first reason is that clean soil, air and water are collective goods that people try to profit from, but are not prepared to pay for. A rationally calculating individual will try to make use of the available collective goods, but will not be prepared to make a contribution in order to remove the pollution that was caused by his or her behavior. The Hobbesian state can break the dilemma of rational Individual behaviour. Garret Hardin (1973) has applied this chain of reasoning to the use that is made of the Commons in our world. William Ophuls (1973) makes use of the same line of reasoning as Hardin when he stresses the necessity for a supra-individual decision-making power and the need for compulsory measures by the state in order to save the environment. According to him people have to choose between Leviathan and Oblivion.

A second reason is that only a robust centre of power-the state-will be able to resist the influence of organized trade and industry whose primary goals are growth of production increasing profits and long-term survival in a strongly competitive market economy and not the protection of environment. A third reason for a central role for the state is to prevent counter-productive

⁹. Kuehls, Thom (1996), *Beyond Sovereign Territory: The Space of Ecopolitics*, London: University of Minnesota Press.

relations of competition between enterprises. Often enterprises find themselves in a stalemate. Companies that are prepared to behave in a more environmentally friendly way run the risk of being eliminated from the market, because of the higher prices of their products. Enterprises that continue to produce high levels of pollution have lower production costs and are thus able to offer their goods to the market more cheaply. The result of this mechanism is that companies that dare to take the initiative will be punished by the consumer, unless the environmentally friendly character of the products is decisive for the consumer. A fourth reason for viewing the state as an essential actor in the field of the environment is that there is a strong need for impartial expertise and the formulation of boundary conditions for sustainable development and to decide what are safe emission levels and norms, to set criteria for environmentally dangerous substances, and to collect relevant information concerning the possibilities for preventing and combating different kinds of pollution. However there is also problem with the Ophulus solution. First, Ophuls implicitly assumes that the individual citizens are the main polluters within society and not private companies and state enterprises. Second, Ophuls starts from an ill-considered conception of freedom and individual rights. Third, Ophuls pretends that there is no substantial difference between an absolute state and a powerful and actively intervening state¹⁰.

Green advocate decentralized institutions. Murray Bookchin gives three reasons for the decentralized society. First, decentralization is absolutely necessary in order to be able to create political entities on a human scale. According to him only small-scale communities render it possible for citizens to know each other personally and to participate jointly in the decision-making process in public meetings. The second argument is that decentralized communities can be sensitively tailored to natural ecosystems. Small decentralized communities do not destroy the natural landscape and can live in harmony with the surroundings. The third argument emanates from the logistical advantages of decentralization. However Bookchin does not see the disadvantages of the decentralization with regard to environmental problems. First, many environmental problems cross the borders of small political entities. Air, water, and soil pollution do not take any notice of borders. Whenever one wants to prevent and control these kinds of pollution, an intensive and well- designed policy will be necessary on a local, regional, national,

¹⁰. Geus, Marius de (1996), "The Ecological Restructuring of the State", in Doherty, Brian and Geus, Marius de(eds.) *Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights and Citizenship*, London and New York: Rutledge.

and international level. The local communities lack the general overview of the 'total ecological situation' and will probably also miss out on the complicated (and expensive) expertise in environmental matters that can be generated far more easily by large-scale centralized organizations.

Ecological restructuring of the state can be done by applying one of the three models- piecemeal engineering model, radical utopian model and ecological restructuring. Liberal democracies are founded on compromises, the weighing of interests and on a careful policy of small steps. There is no room for large-scale, profound changes that focus on the reconstruction of society as whole. Liberals believe in piecemeal change. Green radicals, however, stress that environmental problems require a different approach and that they may undermine the traditional assumptions of policymakers. From green parties and green movements has come the emphasis on the need for far-reaching changes and for a fundamental reconstruction of society as a whole in a sustainable direction. The green argument calls for sweeping changes to an ecological society that is often modeled after a utopian blueprint.

Ecological restructuring deals with policy plans in the areas of production and consumption that can be tried out. The guidelines for the ecological restructuring of the state are - first is the maintenance of free market economy but explicitly under strict ecological limiting conditions. This system possesses a large capability to adapt to historic circumstances; it is less bureaucratic and more decentralized than socialist alternatives. Its task is to restructure the free market economy by taking a range of legal measures and by consequently introducing financial incentive in an environmentally detrimental production. For instance, high fines for the breaking of environmental laws. The second point introduces five basic principles for action on the different levels of society: the prevention principle, the precautionary principle, the judicial liability principle, polluter pay principle and dealing cautiously with the nature. The prevention of pollution should be preferred to the clearing away of waste. This would mean using less packaging, introducing returnable deposit systems and inherently clean production techniques, closing production cycle and decreasing the consumption of goods in general.

The precautionary principle introduced new attitude to anticipate ecological risk in future and to avoid risk. Judicial liability deals with the penalty system and polluter pay principle enlarged the

scope of penalty system e.g. ecotax. As well as this it is worth emphasizing the importance of attaching a central value to the principle of dealing with nature in a careful way. As is also pointed out by Murray Bookchin (1988) and Arne Naess (1989), natural ecosystems are extremely untransparent, complex and elusive. Humanity should not cherish the idea of controlling nature. In most cases the coherent knowledge that is required for adequate interference with nature is lacking. As Andrew Dobson (1990) has explained, this is an argument for treating the earth most carefully and cautiously and in the field of interventions in nature-for adopting a modest and conservative attitude. The third point is that a gradual restructuring of the liberal democratic state will have to take place, making use of valuable elements of ecological visions of anarchist political thinkers like William Godwin, Peter Kropotkin, William Morris and Murray Bookchin. Anarchist ideas suggest a fully decentralized, federally structured organizational form, that makes possible the self-government of individuals local communities. Such anarchist organizational structure emanates from individual freedom and autonomy and from the principle of providing opportunity for members of the organization to govern their own lives and to share responsibility¹¹.

The direction for the future is that of a ‘telescopic eco-state’, which protects the environment to keep society livable (in particular with a view to future generations, including non-human ones), which is maximally based on consent and which applies coercion minimally. The basic characteristics of the telescopic eco-state are- the state is flexible and is mainly decentralized and centralized if necessary. In order to ascertain the democratic level of a telescopic eco-state, combinations of direct participation and political representation can be adopted. The opportunities for participation at a local level might be enlarged to give substance to the old but valuable ideal of citizenship; of public spaces of freedom, in which the members of the political community can exert influence. Similar to a telescope this type of state is more inclined to give in than to stay in a fixed and unyielding position, when one pushes on it. A freedom oriented state that wants to avoid an eco-dictatorship will have to approach the environmental problems via the use of coercive measures as little as possible, but will have to concentrate primarily on

¹¹. Geus, Marius de (1996), “ The Ecological Restructuring of the State”, in Doherty, Brian and Geus, Marius de(eds.) *Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights and Citizenship*.

the creation of situations and conditions that will make it more attractive to the citizens to make environmentally friendly choices.

This kind of state will not prohibit people from buying products that are detrimental to the environment, but will take care that the environmental consequences of certain goods and services will be systematically passed on to prices by way of levies and taxes and that sustainable and recyclable goods become relatively cheap. In this way the individual's freedom of choice in consumption is upheld in essence, while the environment is protected. Like a telescope this state model is focused on bringing closer what lies in the far distance. A telescopic eco-state has a longer time perspective and spots the interests of coming generations. The fourth point of departure for an ecological restructuring of society is a receptive (but not uncritical) attitude towards technological innovations. Eco-state demands eco-technologies.¹²

PATH TO THE GREEN STATE

There are two paths towards the green state, each with its own set of movement strategies. In one scenario, professional environmental NGOs pursue technocratic or weak ecological modernization within the state's decision-making apparatus. In the other scenario, environmental NGOs do not limit their activities in this way, but instead follow the dual strategy of action in the state and civil society. Any development of a green state would be on a par with two prior transformations of the modern state. These earlier transformations were the alignment of the defining interest of the bourgeoisie in profit with the emerging economic growth imperative to constitute the liberal capitalist state, and the linkage of the defining interest of the working class in redistribution with an emerging legitimation imperative to constitute the welfare state. Within green political thinking there are two sorts of orientation to the state. The most long-lived is anticipating the demise of the state in favour of either confederations of self-sufficient communities (e.g. Bookchin, 1982) or bioregional authorities imbued with localist ecological consciousness (McGinnis, 1998) or grassroots participatory democracy.

Another orientation simply takes the state for granted, and develops a list of green actions for the state to take. For example, Goodin (1992) argues that if greens can participate in governing coalitions then better environmental policy ought to follow, provided that they are armed with

¹². Ibid.

his green theory of value. Both of these orientations are wrong because of oversimplification. Against green enthusiasts for decentralization and grassroots democracy, we recognize that the state is likely to be a dominant political force for the foreseeable future and that the state can sometimes be transformed in a greener direction. Against normative green statist, we recognize the major constraints that often systematically prevent states acting in accord with environmental values, irrespective of the presence of greens in government. The German Greens followed Goodin's advice and brought their green theory of value into the federal governing coalition to modest effect, and with successes that can be explained largely in terms of the continued presence of an oppositional public sphere that has kept conservation issues on the political agenda by pressuring Green and non-Green politicians and public officials alike. Al Gore brought his green theory of value to the number two spot in the United States government, and was thoroughly frustrated by the power of the economic imperative.¹³

GREEN STATE

In the context of the modern system of sovereignty states, Daniel Philpot has encapsulated three faces of sovereignty: the holders or recognized units of sovereignty, the standards of membership (in terms of who maybe admitted), and the prerogatives of sovereignty. He has argued that whenever there is a change in any one of these three aspects of sovereignty, it is possible to talk of a revolution in sovereignty. Treaty of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 defined Sovereignty in the territorial sense. But the problem of climate change can break the traditional notion of sovereignty and there may emerge green sovereignty.¹⁴ The environmentalists are advocating a proper character and role of the nation-state vis-à-vis its own society and territory, the society of states, global civil society, and the global environment. They judge the basis of state legitimacy by developing the regulative ideals that confer authority on, and provide the basis of acceptance of, decisions made in the name of the state. In the past, legitimacy was acquired by the provision of military and domestic security and the regulation and enforcement of contracts. Nowadays that legitimacy is primarily acquired by appeal to democracy, typically representative democracy

¹³. Dryzek, John S (2003), *Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway*.

¹⁴. Eckersley, Robyn (2004), *The Green State, Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*, U.S.A: The MIT Press.

of the liberal democratic variety. Yet green political theorists question the liberal democratic state.

Green state does not simply mean a liberal democratic state that is managed by a green party government with a set of programmatic environmental goals. Rather, it means a democratic state whose regulatory ideals and democratic procedures are informed by ecological democracy rather than liberal democracy. Such a state may be understood as a post liberal state insofar as it emerges from an immanent (ecological) critique, rather than from an outright rejection, of liberal democracy. Bourgeoisie in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries served as the vanguard for the creation of the liberal democratic state while the labor movement was in the forefront of the social forces that created the social democratic state (or welfare state) in the twentieth century. If a more democratic and outward-looking state-the green democratic state-is ever to emerge in the new millennium, then the environment movement and the broader green movement will most likely be its harbingers.

Green state advocates ecological democracy which is transnational one. Such a normative ideal poses a fundamental challenge to traditional notions of the nation, of national sovereignty, and the organization of democracy in terms of an enclosed territorial space and polity. It requires new democratic procedures, new decision rules, new forms of political representation and participation, and a more fluid set of relationships and understandings among states and peoples. Green theorists and activists seem to point toward the need for alternative forms of political identity, authority, and governance that break with the traditional statist model of exclusive territorial rule. In matters of institutional design and its programmatic defense of the principles of decentralization, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence its motto is “Think globally, act locally.”¹⁵ However, what is striking is that these principles often sit considerably at odds with the day-to-day campaign demands of environmental activists, organizations, and green parties for more and better state regulation of economic and social practices in order to secure the protection of the environment. Indeed, the same has been said of new social movements in general, which tend, on the one hand, to subscribe to antistatist slogans and the fundamentalist critique of the state’s monopoly of force, while, on the other hand, they propose large doses of

¹⁵. Eckersley, Robyn (2004), *The Green State, Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*.

state resources (both fiscal and repressive) to be made available to the causes of desired social change.

The study of the Green state include what conception of politics, public life, and the state lies behind the green demands made of the state, and how might this be practically embodied more explicitly in the formal constitutional structure and informal political culture of states? There seem to be two basic interrelated ideals about the state implicit in the demands for environmental regulation and justice. The first is a plea for a strong or effective state. The second is a plea for an ethical and democratically responsible state that upholds the public interests and values. There is the hope in green demands upon the state that it would not only act as a good ecological trustee over its own people and territory but also as a good international citizen in the society of states. It is implicit that the green state actively promote collective action in defense of environmental protection and environmental justice while also taking responsibility (both unilaterally and multilaterally) to avoid the displacement of social and ecological costs beyond its own territory and into the future.¹⁶

But there are three core challenges to the green state: first is the anarchic character of the system of sovereign states. The problem is understood as structuring a dynamic of selfish and rivalrous behavior among states that result in the all-too-familiar “tragedy of the commons.” Second is the promotion of capitalist accumulation. The way in which the state is inextricably bound up with, and fundamentally compromised by, globalization is also a key driver of ecological destruction. States are now actively promoting economic globalization in ways that further undermine their own political autonomy and steering capacity. Third is the “democratic deficits” of the liberal democratic state. The liberal state is regarded by many green political theorists as suffering too many democratic deficits to be able to respond to ecological problems in a reflexive and concerted manner. This critique is directed not only to the instrumental rationality of the “administrative state” but also to the liberal character of its democratic regulative ideals, which are seen as inhibiting the protection of public goods such as the environment¹⁷.

¹⁶. Eckersley, Robyn (2004), *The Green State, Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*.

¹⁷. Ibid.

Ecological democracy may be best understood not so much as a democracy of the affected but rather as a democracy for the affected, since the class of beings entitled to have their interests considered in democratic deliberation and decision making (whether young children, the infirm, the yet to be born, or nonhuman species) will invariably be wider than the class of actual deliberators and decision makers. As an ideal, ecological democracy must necessarily always contain this representative dimension. This re conceptualization of the demos as no longer fixed in terms of people and territory provides a challenge to traditional conceptions of democracy that have presupposed some form of fixed enclosure, in terms of territory and people. The ambit claim argues that in relation to the making of any decision entailing potential risk, the relevant moral community must be understood as the affected community or community at risk, tied together not by common passports, nationality, blood line, ethnicity, or religion but by the potential to be harmed by the particular proposal, and not necessarily all in the same way or to the same degree.

The ambit claim for ecological democracy raises complex moral, epistemological, political, and institutional challenges. It is morally challenging because it loosens the requirement of moral reciprocity that is basic to the Kantian tradition of moral reasoning and conventional notions of citizenship by seeking to extend democratic consideration to a somewhat indeterminate community whose members are not all capable of reciprocal recognition. The ambit claim is epistemologically challenging because it asks those who are able to participate in democratic deliberations to search for meaningful, practical, and parsimonious ways of representing the interests of others who may, in varying degrees, not be fully knowable and cannot represent themselves (i.e., future generations and nonhuman others). It seeks to add a new layer to the already vexing question of political representation by adding the concept of political trusteeship: persons and groups within the polity speaking on behalf of the interests of those living outside the polity, for future generation and for nonhuman species. The ambit claim is politically challenging because it calls for ecological qualifications to the exercise of individual human autonomy (including the exercise of property rights) by repositioning actors responsible for risk-generating activities so that they must literally or metaphorically face and answer potential victims, or risk recipients, in an open and critical communicative setting. In short, the demand is that risk generators whether private property holders or public authorities must be able to justify

their activities in a manner that is either literally or notionally acceptable to potential risk recipients.

The failure to provide an acceptable justification to victims and their representatives should mean that the ecological risk-generating activity ought not to be undertaken as a matter of environmental justice. This reversal of the burden of proof would have profound consequences on the conduct of both business and government. The ambit claim for ecological democracy is institutionally challenging because it does not regard the boundaries of the nation-state as necessarily coterminous with the community of morally considerable beings. This poses a direct challenge to the ideas of liberal nationalism and civic republicanism, both of which argue that the proper locus of democratic self-determination should be the national community bounded by culture, sentiment, and the territorial borders of the nation-state¹⁸.

This suggests the need for more flexible democratic procedures. Many green political theorists have turned to deliberative democracy out of dissatisfaction with existing liberal democracy. The primary appeal of deliberative democracy is that it eschews the liberal paradigm of strategic bargaining or power trading among self-interested actors in the marketplace in favor of the paradigm of unconstrained egalitarian deliberation over questions of value and common purpose in the public sphere. That is, the conditions of undistorted and other-regarding communication are defended as more likely to lead to the prudent protection of public goods (e.g., environmental quality) than the distorted and strategic political communication that is characteristic of liberal democracies. Public spirited political deliberation is the process by which we learn of our dependence on others (and the environment) and the process by which we learn to recognize and respect differently situated others (including nonhuman others and future generations). It is the activity through which citizens consciously create a common life and a common future together, including the ecosystem health and integrity that literally sustain us all. Deliberative democracy has a long pedigree, reaching back to Athens, and including the long tradition of civic republicanism as well as more recent innovations in critical theory, such as Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethic. Nonetheless, it is possible to single out three mutually constitutive features that together encapsulate the core ideals and appeal of the deliberative model:

¹⁸. Eckersley, Robyn (2004), *The Green State, Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*.

Unconstrained dialogue: The requirement that dialogue be unconstrained or free is a requirement that only justified arguments should be allowed to sway the participants in the dialogue. This requires that participants give reasons for their proposals, reservations or objections to enable the public testing and evaluation of opposing claims. Jürgen Habermas has argued that this requirement for free or undistorted dialogue is anticipated in the very resort to discourse. That is, the presuppositions of communicative reason are that claims can be rationally assessed for their propositional truth, personal sincerity, and normative rightness. The implicit goal of discourse mutual understanding can thereby be reached on the basis of the unforced force of the better argument. Dialogue becomes constrained and distorted to the extent to which participants are swayed by considerations other than rational argument (e.g., by implicit or explicit force, deception, bribery, or the authority and status of the speaker rather than the content of what is said) or when insufficient time is allowed for deliberation over the meaning and consequences of putative facts or proposed norms. The requirement of free dialogue also necessarily encompasses the requirement of publicity. Dialogue is constrained when information is withheld or misinformation is spread. It is also constrained when parties affected by proposed norms are denied an opportunity to participate or be represented in the dialogue.

Inclusiveness: Deliberative democrats typically enlist the requirement of impartiality as an essential requirement of deliberative dialogue, since the point of deliberation is to weed out purely partial or self-interested arguments in favor of arguments that can be defended as acceptable to all. However, in the light of present-day skepticism toward the very possibility of impartial thinking, the notion of inclusiveness, or enlarged thinking, perhaps better describes the other-regarding orientation that is expected of participants (while also avoiding the debate about the possibility of impartiality). Enlarged thinking or what Hannah Arendt calls representative thinking-refers to the imaginative representation to ourselves of the perspectives and situations of other in the course of formulating, defending, or contesting proposed collective norms.¹⁹

Social learning: The social learning dimension of deliberative democracy flows from the requirement that participants be open and flexible in their thinking, that they enter a public dialogue with a preparedness to have their preferences transformed through reasoned argument.

¹⁹. Eckersely, Robyn (2004), *The Green State, Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*.

This is, to some extent, a restatement of the requirement of free or unconstrained dialogue, whereby participants are moved to change their position by the force of the most appropriately reasoned argument rather than by extraneous considerations. However, this feature also highlights what is typically defended as one of the great strengths of deliberative democracy, that is, its educative and social learning potential. Openness and flexibility on the part of deliberators makes it possible for them to make decisions that are adaptable and self-correcting in face of new circumstances, new information, and new or revised arguments. This is why deliberative democracy is defended as a better candidate than purely aggregative models of democracy (e.g., voting or opinion polling) for enabling reflexive or ecological modernization.

Such a model privileges general interests over private, sectional, or vested interests, thereby making public interest environmental advocacy a virtue rather than an heroic aberration in a world of self-regarding rational actors. It invites reflexivity, self-correction, and the continual public testing of claims. A central contention of this inquiry is that the green democratic is to transcend the ethical subjectivism of liberalism by offering a more critical, inter-subjective assessment of agents' preferences without stifling cultural and moral diversity. However, the green democratic state cannot be relied upon alone to uphold these processes and in any event must always be understood a part of a broader, state-society complex. States and societies are connected by the public sphere, comprising those communication networks or social spaces in which public opinions are produced. One of the aims of green constitutional design should be to facilitate a robust "green public sphere" by providing fulsome environmental information and the mechanisms for contestation, participation, and access to environmental justice especially from those groups that have hitherto been excluded from, or under-represented in, policy-making and legislative processes. Such mechanisms are not only ends in themselves but also mean to enhance the reflexive learning potential of both the state and civil society.²⁰

Green state is a transnational state. The principles of affectedness and belongingness or membership each provide a conceptually distinctive basis upon which to institutionalize democracy. Ideally, at least, the cosmopolitan principle of affectedness applies to all citizens of the world who are affected, regardless of membership in any particular community, while the communitarian principle of belongingness or membership requires the delimitation of particular

²⁰. Eckersley, Robyn (2004), *The Green State, Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*.

political communities with clear territorial boundaries for the purpose of democratic governance. Of course, in practice, administrative boundaries of some kind are just as necessary for cosmopolitan governance as for communitarian governance to enable the marshaling of democratic will and the implementation of democratic decisions by means of law. In both cases, then, determining the boundaries of the relevant political community is always a contested matter and in practice one usually finds a blending of the principles. Relatively speaking, however, there appear to be many more practical difficulties associated with delineating the relevant community of affected individuals for the purpose of institutionalizing cosmopolitan democracy than there are with delineating the relevant community and territory for the purpose of institutionalizing communitarian democracy.²¹

III. CONCLUSION

The chapter depicts the futuristic thinking of the green school of politics. It is possible that the coming state is the green state. Green state is quite different from the Marxist or capitalist state. It is a post- liberal and transnational state. It is beyond territory. Green state believes in transnational democracy. It includes not only the present generation but also the future generation. It is more inclusive and it talks about green democracy. Green democracy is not the democracy of affected but for affected boundaries of affected communities. The elements of green democracy are- stress on small decentralized communities, face to face assemblies and proximate forms of participation and accountability and strong emphasis on equality of input from all community members. Green state promotes collective action and demand green sovereignty. The chapter also highlights three core challenges to the green state- anarchic character of the system of sovereign state, promotion of capitalist accumulation and democratic deficits of the liberal state.

²¹. Eckersley, Robyn (2004), *The Green State, Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*.